In this study, we evaluate whether the increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has resulted in their increased use for foreign policy behavior by the nations of the world. This question is examined in three related ways: (1) the aggregate use of IGOs for foreign policy behavior; (2) the relationship between IGO membership and IGO use; and (3) the kinds of states that use IGOs. Our data base consists of the 35 nations in the CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set for the years [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] .
The main findings are that IGOs were employed over 60 percent of the time with little fluctuation on a year-by-year basis, that global and "high politics" IGOs were used more often than regional and "low politics" IGOs, that institutional membership and IGO use were generally inversely related, and that the attributes of the states had limited utility in accounting for the use of intergovernmental organizations. Some of the theoretical implications of these findings are then explored.
The growth of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has been astounding since the end of World War II. Although only about 100 IGOs existed in 1950, the number of such organizations has reached well over 250 by the mid-1970s (Wallace and Singer, 1970, pp. 272, 275-80; Kegley and Rochester, 1971, pp. 403-04; and the Yearbook of International Organizations, 1974 Organizations, , 1977 . Moreover, this growth has occurred not only in terms of geographical distribution of such organizations but also in terms of functional issues with which they deal. Despite a considerable literature documenting this growth in the number and types of IGOs, only a scant amount of research relates this institutional growth to their use for coordinating foreign relations among nations.1 Thus we know little about the extent to which nations use IGOs as a foreign *Support for this research was provided by the Iowa State University Grants Committee in the form of an initiation grant to the first author. Special thanks are due Charles Hermann and his co-investigators on the CREON Project for allowing use of these data in this study. The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research provided a copy of the CREON data set after the CREON investigators released it for use in this project. We also thank several reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts. Neither the original collectors of the data, the Consortium, nor the reviewers bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
1For a review of the empirically based research on international organizations, see Alger (1970) . Also, see Kihi (1971) for a previous study of IGO-nation-state linkage.
policy forum, the kinds of nations that use them, and what impact such organizations have on the conduct of foreign policy behavior.
In this study, we address some of these concerns by investigating empirically the linkage between foreign policy behavior and the use of intergovernmental organizations. Specifically, we examine two interrelated sets of questions. The first set of questions focuses upon the aggregate use of IGOs: (1) To what extent do nations employ IGOs for conducting foreign policy? (2) To what extent do nations use the various types of IGOs (e.g., global versus regional and "high politics" versus "low politics") for this behavior? (3) Have these patterns changed over time? A second set of questions examines the characteristics of nations that act or interact with one another through IGOs. In particular, we focus upon the relationship between IGO membership and IGO use and between the national attributes of states and IGO use. The questions addressed here are: (1) Is IGO membership related to the use of these organizations? That is, do nations that hold memberships in a large number of IGOs also tend to employ them more frequently than those without such extensive memberships? Similarly, does this pattern hold when we examine the relationship between membership and the use of various types of organizations (global, regional, high Three important concepts frame our subsequent discussion: IGOs, IGO use, and foreign policy behavior. While we discuss foreign policy behavior below, let us now define IGOs and IGO use. The term intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) refers to those organizations which have nations as members in contrast to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which have individuals and private groups as members. The specific definitional criteria used to identify IGOs followed the standards set down by the United Nations and the Yearbook of International Organizations: "All organizations established by agreements to which three States or more are parties. . . ." Using these criteria, the IGOs included here ranged from such well-known organizations as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to such lesser-known organizations as the Cocoa Producers Alliance and the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine. IGO use refers to any activity by a nation in which an intergovernmental organization is engaged as a forum for fostering national policy, as an instrument of that policy, or as an arena for coordinating behavior with other states.2 Some illustrations of foreign policy behavior within IGOs (taken from the data set discussed below) might be helpful in clarifying our definition. Activities within IGOs ranged, for example, from the United States giving assurances to their NATO allies against external threats, to Kenya, at a meeting of the Organization of African Unity, accepting an offer from Zambia to mediate its border dispute with Somalia to Venezuela asking the Organization of American States to take action against Cuban aggression.
The Data
The evidence with which to answer our research questions was drawn from the data set compiled by Charles Hermann and his associates, called Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON). It is supplemented with a separate data collection on IGO membership for the nations in the sample. We chose the CREON data set because it was coded in a way which indicated whether a nation's foreign policy behavior (or event) occurred within the context of an international organization or 2For a recent informative discussion identifying these uses of international organizations, see Butterworth (1978, pp. 7-8) .
outside of it.3 When the behavior occurred within an international organization, the name of the specific IGO was coded so that we knew the exact context in which the foreign policy action took place.
The CREON data consist of 11,665 foreign policy events initiated by some 35 nations gathered during randomly selected quarters (January-March for 1961 , 1965 April-June for 1960 , 1963 , 1967 July-September for 1964 , 1966 and October-December for 1959 , 1962 , 1968 to represent the 1959-1968 decade. Although the rationale for the selection of the CREON nations, the definition of what constitutes a foreign policy event, and a description of the extensive precautions in collecting and coding these events are fully reported elsewhere (Hermann et al., 1973, esp. pp. 15-31) , we need to identify three potential data problems in using the CREON data set and to offer some caveats about making inferences from it.
The first potential problem is that only a sample of nations is used in the analysis. While the set of states in the CREON sample is obviously not wholly representative of the nations in the international system, nonetheless, a cursory inspection of the CREON list in the appendix makes clear that many of the principal types of states have been included. For example, the CREON nations not only represent a wide variation in physical size, political orientation, and economic development, but also include all geographical areas of the world.
The second problem is that the CREON data are taken from a single source, Deadline Data on World Affairs. This necessarily raises the question of "source coverage"-a problem endemic to all events data sets. A number of studies on this topic have noted that a single source is particularly troublesome because of the low degree of reporting overlap between sources and because of the tendency of some 3The specific variable from the CREON data set that was used to measure behavior within an IGO was variable 9. In a few instances (less than 4 percent of the total), events occurred within the CREON list of international organizations that would not qualify as IGOs according to our definition (e.g., "countries generally associated with the U.S.," "nonaligned countries," etc.). Since these behaviors constitute such a small portion of the total, we included them with the IGO behavior category for analytic purposes. Each of these events, of course, was subsequently classified according to the nearest type of IGO as outlined below. See the organizational appendix in the CREON Project Codebook (Hermann et al., 1975, p. 29) for further examples of these instances.
newspapers and chronologies to report only certain kinds of "newsworthy" events (Azar et al., 1972; Doran et al., 1973; Smith, 1969; and Scolnick, 1974) . In support of their data coverage, the CREON investigators point out that they used the uncollapsed Deadline Data files for their coding procedures (rather than the briefer collapsed set usually available) and that, in their on-site inspection of the Deadline Data operation, summaries of the world press were widely used. As they note (Hermann et al., 1973, p. 18) : "Events for our 35 nations are derived from 46 sources of wide geographical, functional, and ideological variation ranging, for example, from the New York Times to Havana Radio to the International Financial News Survey to L 'Unite Africaine-all of which are abstracted by Deadline Data." Despite this coverage, they nevertheless do call for attempts to isolate the extent of bias in their data.
The third potential source of bias is the use of yearly quarters to represent years. This is a possible problem because some parts of years may be more active in international politics than others (Hermann et al., 1973, p. 25) .
Thus, some yearly totals may be greater than others owing solely to the portion of the year sampled. Although Hermann et al. acknowledge some differences in their summary description of the data, the differences that they report between quarters (and thus years) are quite small. They range from a low of about 23 percent of the activity in the first quarter to a high of over 26 percent in the third quarter (pp. 24-25) . For this reason, the problem would appear to be negligible in altering the results of our analysis.
But this assessment of the data fails to take into account foreign policy behavior occurring only within IGOs. Would this type of behavior be under-represented or over-represented owing to the quarter that was sampled? The potential problem is that some IGOs tend to have greater activity within particular quarters (principally the last quarter of the year) and thus would more likely be reported and subsequently collected in the CREON data set. According to our breakdown of the yearly data, the percentage of IGO behavior within each quarter ranges from 6.1 percent for 1960, when the April-June quarter is used as the sampling quarter, to 14.1 percent for 1962 when the October-December quarter is used. However, the other quarters are within a much narrower range, from 9.3 to 11.6 percent for the other eight years. Judging from these results, it seems that undersampling or oversampling of certain IGO behavior is not a major constraint upon our investigation. This conclusion, however, cannot be hard and fast for at least two reasons. First, there is no assured way of determining the universe of all IGO behavior, dependent as we are upon the coverage of the data source. Second, differences between quarters (and thus years) also reflect real differences in the use of IGOs for foreign policy activities; therefore, quarterly differences would be expected.
When we further analyzed the types of IGO behavior reported in the quarters, we did find different levels of "low politics" and "regional" IGO behavior as compared to "high politics" and "global" IGO behavior. Again, however, the exact source of these differences cannot be attributed solely to underreporting but undoubtedly reflect real differences in the level of use by nations. On balance, then, our position is that particular kinds of IGO activity may be somewhat under-represented-owing to the potential source coverage problem and to the use of quarters as yearly representatives-but that real differences are also reflected in the data. Overall, we do not believe that this potential source of error will alter the thrust of our general findings because the differences between the various IGOs turn out to be quite substantial.
In sum, while we recognize these three possible data biases (and thus caution against pushing the results too far), we nonetheless concur with the CREON investigators that their data set does offer a good first approximation of the foreign policy behavior of the 35 nations sampled. Additionally, and crucially for the study at hand, it is the only data set to our knowledge that offers a readily available means of identifying such behavior in the context of IGOs.
The other part of our data, consisting of information on organizational memberships for the 35 CREON nations, was taken from the Yearbook of International Organizations (1969) .4 By examining the membership lists of the 219 IGOs in the Yearbook, we were able to ascertain the extent to which each of the CREON nations belonged to them.5 Next we 4The 1969 edition of the Yearbook was chosen because it appeared toward the end of the CREON data years (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) and would likely incorporate most of the IGOs that had been in existence throughout the period. On occasion, other Yearbooks were consulted to ascertain accurate membership information.
51n the appendix, we note the number of IGOs to which each of the CREON nations belonged. Overall, a total of 221 distinct IGOs were identified in the Yearbook. Of those, two IGOs (International Diplo-coded each of the IGOs according to geographical and functional type.6 These two categories were chosen because a more exacting breakdown would seriously reduce the number of IGOs in each group and would therefore make any analysis more difficult and less useful. More importantly, these two categories have direct relevance for our subsequent evaluation of the regionalist and functionalist arguments. We also distinguished between those organizations that were either global or regional in membership. Such an organizational distinction was usually readily apparent when we surveyed the membership lists. The only difficulty arose over those organizations that had member-states derived primarily from one region but which also included at least one non-regional memberstate-the so-called "quasi-regional" organizations (Nye, 1971, p. 8) . At this point, we made a research decision to include these organizations within the regional category because there were only a limited number of these organizations and because we could more easily test the regionalist argument.
Finally, the functional classification also divided the intergovernmental organizations into two groups: each IGO was classified as either a "high politics" or a "low politics" organization. The classification scheme was based upon Pentland's discussion (1976, pp. 628-29) of four types of international organizations: (1) diplomatic-military, (2) economic management or development, (3) technical-functional, and (4) social and cultural. The first category formed our "high politics" organizations group and the latter three formed the "low politics" organizations group. To classify the IGOs, we categorized each of the organizations into the "high politics" and "low politics" groups using 1959-1968.7 For the yearly breakdowns, 7These percentages were calculated in the following way: (1) the foreign policy events (or behavior) for each nation were divided into those that occurred within and outside IGOs; (2) percentages of behavior within each category were then calculated for each nation; and (3) mean percentages for both categories were computed (only the percentages of behavior within IGOs are portrayed in Table 1 for each year and in total). The figures in parentheses in the first part of Table 1 are the number of foreign policy events contributed by all nations for the particular year and in total. We calculated the rest of the percentages in Table 1 and all the percentages in  Tables 3 and 4 using a similar format.
It is important to emphasize that the percentages shown are the mean percentages of behavior which we calculated by averaging the mean percentages for each individual nation. We believe this measure is more meaningful than simply calculating the mean level of foreign policy events across a year or in total, as has been done in past research. This latter approach fails to take into account the relative contribution of each nation. For example, active states with many foreign policy actions in one category could disproportionately skew the results when events are the unit of analysis. This is less likely to be the case when the nation is the unit of analysis.
At this juncture, we should emphasize that we have not attempted to measure the importance of the kinds of foreign policy behavior undertaken within or outside IGOs; rather, our concern is the use of these organizations for foreign policy purposes. cEntries represent the mean percentages of behavior within each category. These were computed by averaging the mean percentages for each nation in a particular year (or in total). The percentages shown subtracted from 100 give the percentage of foreign policy behavior outside IGOs, within global IGOs, and within high politics IGOs, respectively. dThe Ns represent the number of CREON nations that acted within and/or outside IGOs for each year. (The N for the total category is the sum of the Ns for the individual years.) The figures in parentheses are the number of foreign policy events contributed by all nations in the particular year or in total.
eThe Ns represent the number of CREON nations that acted within regional and/or global IGOs as well as within low politics and/or high politics IGOs. (They are the same for these different types.) The N for the total category is the sum of the Ns for the individual years. The figures in parentheses are the number of foreign policy events contributed by all nations in the particular year or in total.
fDifference of means tests were calculated for within/outside, regional/global and low politics/high politics percentages. All were significant beyond the .001 level.
were not employed more frequently than global organizations. The average use of these regional IGOs was under 29 percent, while the average use of global IGOs was about 71 percent. For the functional dimension, high politics IGOs were employed most frequently; these organizations were used about 62 percent of the time while the low politics organizations were used less than 38 percent of the time. Nonetheless, low politics organizations were used extensively in three particular years-1964, 1965, and 1966 -but the pattern of such use was not sustained across the other seven years. On the whole, then, we must emphasize that the low politics IGOs were used infrequently during the 1960s.
These sets of results seem to call into question some of the regionalist and functionalist arguments regarding international organizations. First of all, our findings for the [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] period imply that regional organizations have not gained much currency as foreign policy arenas for the CREON nations. Thus our results do not seem very encouraging for the theoretical arguments which suggest that regional organizations may be important means of creating "islands of peace" in the international system (Nye, 1971; Yalem, 1965;  and Falk and Mendlovitz, 1973) . Despite the rapid development of regional IGOs, the use of such organizations for foreign policy apparently has not accelerated at a similar pace. In fact, a plot of the regional IGO data over time shows a small but consistent downturn in use.
The data in Table 1 also seem not to support the functionalist position (Mitrany, 1943; Haas, 1964; Sewell, 1966; Claude, 1971, pp. 378-407; and Pentland, 1973, pp. 64-146) .
According to this view, low politics concerns are less controversial than high politics concerns and are thus more likely to foster the process of multilateral cooperation. If this argument holds, we should see the use of IGOs expand in low politics areas and eventually into the high politics areas, too. Our aggregate trend data for the low politics organizations, however, do not seem to support such a view; rather, we detect a slight downturn over the years, despite the brief 1964-1966 upswing. This result is somewhat surprising when one recalls that the low politics organizations have increased more rapidly than any other type of intergovernmental organization (Pentland, 1976, p. 628 ). Since our inferences are based upon an analysis of a particular time span, both of these conclusions regarding the regionalist and functionalist arguments must remain tentative. We shall, however, have more to say about each conclusion as we analyze the linkage between IGO membership and IGO use, and the characteristics of nations that employ IGOs.
IGO Membership and IGO Use. Table 2 shows correlations between IGO membership data for each nation (total membership, global membership, regional membership, high politics membership, low politics membership, and the various combination of these) with the appropriate foreign policy use by each state within these types of organizations.9 The first important finding is that total membership and total use do produce a significant correlation, albeit a negative one (-.36). Because it is negative, the correlation implies that the more IGOs a nation belongs to, the less it uses these organizations for foreign policy purposes. Such a result suggests that increased membership ties have not necessarily produced increased IGO use; rather, these organizations have been utilized much more selectively.
There are some exceptions to this conclusion which qualify what we said earlier about the regionalist and functionalist arguments. As also indicated in Table 2 , regional IGO membership and regional IGO use show a significant positive correlation of .39, while global membership and global IGO use produce an insignificant negative correlation of -.25. The implication of the first statistic is that regional ties have had a positive impact on nations using such IGOs: the more a nation joins regional IGOs, the more likely it is to use them for foreign policy behavior. A parallel statement cannot be made for global organizations. (In fact, the global data suggest an insignificant inverse relationship.) In this sense, those who argue for a regionalist approach to solving international problems can find some solace in these results. Thus, although global IGOs are most widely used, the degree of correspondence between joining IGOs and actually using them appears more evident in regional IGOs.
The other significant results from Table 2 are the correlations for the high politics and low politics organizations. Membership in high politics IGOs is inversely related to their use (-.64), while membership in low politics IGOs is positively correlated with use in these organi9The exact procedure for obtaining these correlations was as follows. We first calculated membership "scores" for the CREON nations in each of the membership categories (global, regional, etc.). Next we computed the percentage of IGO behavior for each nation within each similar organizational category. Finally, we correlated the appropriate pair with one another using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.
zations (.47) . What this first correlation seems to suggest is that the nations with few such memberships use them extensively. For example, CREON nations like Ivory Coast, Guinea, Ghana, and Egypt, among others, held few memberships in high politics organizations, yet a large portion of their foreign policy behavior occurred within these organizations. Conversely, CREON nations like France, West Germany, Japan, and Italy, among others, which belonged to many high politics organizations used them less extensively for their IGO foreign policy activities. Both of these patterns within the high politics organizations contribute to the negative correlation that we obtained. By way of contrast, the percentage of IGO behavior within the low politics organizations roughly corresponded to the extent of memberships in these organizations by the CREON nations. The more memberships in these low politics organizations, the greater the use of such organizations for foreign policy.
Such results suggest that a closer linkage exists between memberships in low politics organizations and using them for foreign policy purposes than for high politics organizations. In this limited sense, the functionalist argument seems to garner some support. Moreover, this position is enhanced even more if one considers that the only other significant correlation in Table 2 is for regional low politics (.51). But again, while such trends are encouraging to the functionalist position, they must be tempered by the fact that the high politics organizations are most extensively used (Table 1) . National Attributes and IGO Use. The first set of figures in Table 3 shows the relative use of IGOs (as compared to other means of conducting foreign policy) controlling for the size of the nation, the level of economic development, and a combination of these two factors. Evidently, small states have used IGOs to a much greater extent than large states; the degree of difference is quite substantial-73 percent as compared to 52 percent. When we compare this difference between large and small states with what we obtained for the development dimension or for a combined size and development dimension (although this one reaches statistical significance), size still appears to be the more discriminating factor in accounting for relative IGO use. Moreover, this finding suggests that small states see IGOs as a particularly good way to carry on foreign policy at a relatively low cost (East, 1973, p. 565 ).
When we examine behavior within IGOs, however, the relative size of the nation does not seem to be the key factor that accounts for differences in use of the geographical and functional IGOs (also see Table 3 ). In fact, for the global/regional IGO breakdown, none of the national attribute characteristics produces significant differences in the relative use of these organizations. Although all states use global IGOs more extensively than regional IGOs, the differences between types of states are always small and statistically insignificant. Even when we combine these two dimensions (section C of Table 3 ), we do not find larger differences between the states. Thus our analysis by type of state does not differentiate among patterns of use within geographical types of organizations. For the functional breakdown, on the other hand, the results are somewhat more encouraging. While neither size nor a combination of size and development produces statistically significant differences, the level of economic development does. Developing states use high politics IGOs significantly What this analysis implies is that poor states, irrespective of size, tend to employ IGOs that will gain them the most political and economic benefits. These are more often the global and high politics organizations. Such results are generally consistent with some previous findings on small/large state behavior, although we find that the developing/developed dimension is more potent. A previous study (East, 1973, p. 576) , for instance, discovered that small states tend to act more selectively in conducting foreign policy than do large states and tend to seek maximum impact with their actions. A similar pattern appears to occur for the developing states in our data; they tend to be selective in their employment of IGOs and seek the greatest payoff when they use them-primarily through the global and high politics IGOs. Finally, this set of results highlights the fact that developed states are apparently the only kinds of nations that have a sufficient resource base and a large enough foreign policy bureaucracy to use global, regional, and low politics organizations simultaneously.
We can obtain an even clearer picture of the relative utility of these national attributes in differentiating among levels of IGO use by one final analysis. Table 4 presents levels of IGO use by the four types of states with a more refined categorization of IGOs (global high politics, global low politics, regional high politics, and regional low politics). All states use global high politics organizations to a much greater extent than any other type of IGO. Usage ranges from 41 percent for large developed states to 59 percent for large developing states. But these differences prove to be statistically insignificant by our analysis of variance test; therefore, we must conclude that, even here, the type of state does not have any substantial impact on the use of global high politics organizations. A similar dThe Ns represent the number of CREON nations that acted within regional and/or global IGOs as well as within low politics and/or high politics IGOs. (They are the same for these different types.) The figures in parentheses are the number of foreign policy events contributed by each type of nation. *Significant differences beyond the .05 level for difference of means test and one-way analysis of variance. Because there was not homogeneity of variances for the low politics analysis of variance, the Kruskal-Wallis test was employed. The result was not significant. conclusion results for the global low politics analysis. All types of CREON nations use these organizations at about the same rate, except for the large developing states. This difference is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that China failed to use these organizations at all during the ten years of our data base. The regional high politics and low politics organizations, however, exhibit some differences; small developing states use the former most frequently, and the developed states use the latter most often. But here, too, we cannot say much more about these differences since all fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. A second finding buttresses this conclusion regarding the realist argument. Our data also show that increased institutional ties in world politics have generally not been translated into increased use of IGOs-at least for the years 1959 to 1968. Contrary to our initial expectations, institutional growth and usage have been inversely related. In this sense, while formal ties between states have expanded in recent years, the degree of IGO use for foreign policy has not increased correspondingly. For the regional and low politics IGOs, however, this observation is less applicable. In these instances, increased membership is tied to increased use. In a limited way, then, the regionalist and functionalist arguments have some validity for enhancing the level of multilateral activities and for constructing a web of interdependence among sovereign states. Put differently, the functional agencies have had some impact on altering the prominence of bilateral diplomacy for carrying on interstate relations. However, we must emphasize the limited nature of this functional strategy of international cooperation in light of our overall results.
A third major finding-the prominent use of high politics organizations by all types of and social-cultural ones-grew more rapidly. Thus the success of the functional approach to international institution-building seems mainly confined to the low politics arena and has not appreciably affected the high politics ones. Also the fact that IGO membership in these organizations does not correlate positively with IGO use implies that the use of high politics IGOs is a selective one, apparently keyed to achieving specific foreign policy objectives. Our last finding-the tendency for developing states to use global and high politics organizations more extensively than regional and low politics organizations-also emphasizes the basic utilitarian nature of IGO use. Because the poor states cannot use all types of IGOs (constrained as they are by domestic resource requirements), they tend to select the ones most likely to gain them the maximum benefit. The constraints of the CREON data set do not allow us to go further and make more definitive statements about the total impact of IGOs in altering foreign policy behavior. Nevertheless, the thrust of our results points to one important conclusion: despite the growth in the number of IGOs during the 1960s, the usage of these organizations for foreign policy purposes remained unchanged. Whether this pattern holds for the 1970s is certainly open to question, especially in light of a changing international system, increasingly characterized as "complex" and "interdependent" (Keohane and Nye, 1977 
